Indian Wars Everywhere by Stefan Aune;

Author:Stefan Aune;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780520395411
Publisher: University of California Press

“40 MILES IN INDIAN COUNTRY”

In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon promised that America would continue to support its allies through its nuclear umbrella, as well as the provision of aid and assistance, but it would avoid deploying large numbers of ground troops. This “Nixon Doctrine” was interpreted by some as a repudiation of Vietnam, specifically the commitment of large numbers of ground troops pursuing counterinsurgency. Nixon’s policies resonated with many Americans, who were eager to avoid similar conflicts in the future.113 At the same time, withdrawal from Vietnam precipitated a backlash to perceived US weakness, the “Vietnam syndrome.” There were many who believed that Vietnam was a defeat of policy, not of the armed forces. They claimed the US military lost the war but was never defeated on the battlefield.114 In cultural venues, the Rambo film franchise and magazines like Soldier of Fortune celebrated a particular brand of white masculinity some believed was under threat, a masculinity that would right the perceived wrongs of defeat in Vietnam.115 More extreme manifestations of this backlash included the rise of racist extremist groups who saw the Vietnam War as a betrayal of the military by a corrupt government. This Vietnam War story helped fuel the rise of the white power movement that culminated in the Oklahoma City bombing carried out by Timothy McVeigh.116 As Americans debated the legacies of the Vietnam War, members of the military deliberated over what lessons should be drawn from the conflict. This was particularly true for the role of counterinsurgency warfare.117

Given the commitment to not replicate Vietnam, some in the US military argued that there was no longer a need to train soldiers in counterinsurgency. The armed forces had spent millions on research into counterinsurgency “to accumulate tons of reference material which no one knows how to use,” as one officer put it. However, these were not universally held opinions. Lieutenant Colonel James R. Johnson, addressing the aftermath of Vietnam, countered such arguments with a simple history lesson: “Since its inception, the American Army has experienced at least 21 years of direct participation in revolutionary warfare (not including the Indian campaigns, the Moro suppressions, or punitive expeditions into Mexico) compared to some 12 years in conventional war and no years in nuclear war. There is little reason to suspect that the future will bring substantial changes in ratio.”118 We might quibble with Johnson’s numbers. Twenty-one years falls far short of the mark if we count the ongoing occupation of Native nations. Nonetheless, what Johnson correctly points out is that the US military has a long history of irregular warfare. These were the savage wars, the uncivilized wars, the wars of guerrillas, insurgents, and ambushes. It was not a foregone conclusion that this history would be continually forgotten and then relearned, but the ebb and flow of US foreign policy, marked by a consistent expansion outward, meant that the guerrilla continually appeared as an opponent.

Despite the call for no more Vietnams, the United States waged or supported numerous counterinsurgency wars in the final decades of the Cold War.

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